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EPHEMERAL MESSAGING APPLICATIONS AND THE PRESIDENCY:
HOW TO KEEP THE PRESIDENT FROM BLOCKING THE SUNSHINE
Caroline Madison Pope*
Since the creation of Snapchat in 2011, many Americans
regularly communicate via ephemeral messaging applications.
While novel forms of communication technology—such as e-mails
or text messages—have historically created complex record
retention problems, ephemeral messaging applications are different
because these applications delete messages by default. Thus, this
deliberately ephemeral communication model presents unique
challenges when used by a sitting United States President because
the Presidential Records Act, which mandates record retention,
leaves citizens powerless to prevent the President from destroying
Presidential Records. This Article presents two potential solutions
to this “Presidential-sized” problem. First, Congress could create
a private right of action for citizens to challenge the President’s use
of ephemeral messaging applications to prevent the loss of
important government records. Alternatively, since the government
owns Presidential records, a President’s use of ephemeral
messaging applications could be treated as the destruction of
government property.
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I.
INTRODUCTION
Imagine a President sitting in the Oval Office while a fire burns
in the fireplace. That afternoon, the President receives a letter from
a foreign leader concerning a critical trade deal. After reading the
letter, what if the President ripped the letter into pieces and threw
the scraps in the fire? Similarly, imagine a President using their
personal e-mail address to communicate about government
business. What if the President subsequently deleted all workrelated e-mails from that personal e-mail account? Finally, imagine
a President requiring their staff to discard, delete, or destroy any
messages the staff received from the President about official
business. What if the President’s staff did, in fact, destroy those
messages? Even more, what if an application automatically deleted
those messages as soon as a staff member read them? In other words,
what if the President and the President’s staff used ephemeral
messaging applications, i.e., applications that deliberately delete
messages shortly after the recipient reads the messages,1 to
communicate?
Whether a sitting President is permitted to burn, delete, or
destroy official documents is not a difficult legal question—the
answer is technically no.2 However, the more difficult question is: If
a President chooses to destroy official communications, what can
citizens do to stop the President? Unfortunately, right now, the
answer is not much.3
Record preservation is a longstanding legal duty that arises in
several contexts. For example, the common law “duty to preserve”
requires parties to refrain from destroying evidence related to

1

PC MAG, DEFINITION OF EPHEMERAL MESSAGE APP, https://www.pcmag.com/
encyclopedia/term/ephemeral-message-app [https://perma.cc/M3P4-SC93] (defining
an ephemeral messaging app as “[a] messaging application that causes the sent
message or video to disappear in the recipient’s device after a short duration”).
2
See 44 U.S.C. § 2203(e).
3
See Armstrong v. Exec. Off. of the President, Off. of Admin. (Armstrong II),
1 F.3d 1274, 1293 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (citing Armstrong v. Bush (Armstrong I), 924
F.2d 282, 290 (D.C. Cir. 1991)) (“[D]isposal decisions under the PRA are
unreviewable.”).
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reasonably foreseeable litigation.4 This duty stems from the
presumption that, if a party resorts to destroying evidence, the
evidence must have been harmful to the party who destroyed it.5
Similarly, most government officials and agencies are statutorily
required to preserve certain records because accessing those
materials allows the public to hold elected officials accountable.6
For example, those government records may be used to satisfy
federal Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”) requests, which allow
citizens to compel federal agencies to release specific documents.7
States have enacted their own public records statutes, sometimes

4
See Thomas Y. Allman, Dealing with Prejudice: How Amended Rule 37(e)
Has Refocused ESI Spoliation Measures, 26 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 1, 11–15 (2020)
(explaining how this common law duty to preserve is reflected in Rule 37(e) of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which imposes sanctions on any party who
“acted with the intent to deprive another party of the information’s use”); see also
FED. R. CIV. P. 37(e) advisory committee’s note to 2015 amendment. The
advisory committee’s note explains that Rule 37(e) is based on the common-law
duty to preserve and “does not attempt to create a new duty to preserve.” Id.
5
See Robert Keeling, Sometimes, Old Rules Know Best: Returning to Common
Law Conceptions of the Duty to Preserve in the Digital Information Age, 67
CATH. U. L. REV. 67, 68–69 (2018) (“Intentional destruction of material evidence
once litigation commenced (or was imminent) might give rise to an inference that
the evidence was adverse to the interest of the party who destroyed it.”); see also
Brookshire Bros. v. Aldridge, 438 S.W.3d 9, 24 (Tex. 2014) (explaining that,
since ephemeral messages are destroyed directly after being sent, a party’s use of
them may be considered “intentional spoliation” and includes “the concept of
willful blindness, ‘which encompasses the scenario in which a party does not
directly destroy evidence[,] . . . but nonetheless ‘allows for its destruction.’”);
Mark Rosman et al., Retaining Ephemeral Messages to Prepare for DOJ Scrutiny,
LAW360, 2 (July 29, 2019, 2:10 PM), https://www.wsgr.com/publications/
|PDFSearch/law360-0719.pdf [https://perma.cc/352U-HV7J] (“Some judges may
view the mere use of ephemeral messaging apps—because of their temporary
nature—as a factor demonstrating an individual’s attempt to purposefully conceal
unlawful communications.”).
6
See Michael Morisy, Requester’s Voice: Nate Jones, MUCKROCK (Feb. 19,
2016), https://www.muckrock.com/news/archives/2016/feb/19/requesters-voicenate-jones/ [https://perma.cc/GU9L-FA5X] (explaining that, although the FOIA
is not perfect, the statute “gives the public a fighting chance to force the
government to give information [the government] wants to keep secret”).
7
5 U.S.C. § 552.
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nicknaming them “sunshine laws,”8 because these statutes exist “to
ensure an informed citizenry vital to the functioning of a democratic
society, needed to check against corruption and to hold the
governors accountable to the governed.”9 While these statutes and
common law principles have never perfectly prevented material
evidence from being destroyed, they emphasize the importance of
record retention by deterring document destruction and
incentivizing parties to reasonably preserve relevant evidence.10
Despite the importance of record preservation, all three branches
of government have historically struggled to determine how new
communication technology fits within the current “duty to preserve”
framework.11 Ephemeral messaging applications are no exception,
yet these apps pose a unique threat to the preservation of documents
subject to the Presidential Records Act because, unlike e-mails and
text messages, communications sent via ephemeral messaging apps

8

State Sunshine Laws, BALLOTPEDIA, https://ballotpedia.org/State_sunshine_
laws [https://perma.cc/W8CP-2TBE] (last visited Oct. 11, 2021).
9
NLRB v. Robbins Tire & Rubber Co., 437 U.S. 214, 242 (1978).
10
See, e.g., WeRide Corp. v. Huang, No. 5:18-cv-07233-EJD 2020 WL
1967209, *9, *11 (N.D. Cal., Apr. 24, 2020) (imposing FED. R. CIV. P. 37(e)
sanctions against defendants for failing to preserve Electronically Stored
Information (“ESI”) given the “staggering” amount of spoliation).
11
See e.g., Daxton R. Stewart, Killer Apps: Vanishing Messages, Encrypted
Communications, and Challenges to Freedom of Information Laws When Public
Officials “Go Dark”, 10 CASE W. RSRV. J.L. TECH. & INTERNET 1, 3 (2019)
(explaining that government officials’ use of ephemeral messaging applications
is “not the first time a new digital communication technology has created a
challenge for government record-keeping and accessibility under open records
laws”). The Department of Justice (“DOJ”) has similarly struggled with how to
handle ephemeral messaging applications. Jamila M. Hall & Jason S. Varnado,
DOJ Loosens Prohibition on “Ephemeral Communications”; SEC Does Not,
Jones Day (Mar. 2019), https://www.jonesday.com/en/insights/2019/03/dojloosens [https://perma.cc/68UT-AWGM]. In 2017, the DOJ prohibited the use of
ephemeral messaging applications for any party that intended to seek Foreign
Corrupt Practices Act (“FCPA”) remediation credit. Id. However, in 2019, the
DOJ reversed its policy and now requires any company seeking FCPA leniency
to implement “appropriate guidance and controls” on the use of ephemeral
messaging services that could “undermine the company’s ability to appropriately
retain business records or communications or otherwise comply with the
company’s document retention policies or legal obligations.” Id.
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cannot be retrieved.12 Notably, Congress’s failure to update these
laws has rendered courts powerless to stop the destruction of
government communications when the President and the President’s
staff use ephemeral messaging applications.13
This Article presents two potential solutions to this
“Presidential-sized” problem. First, Congress could create a private
right of action for citizens to challenge a government official’s use
of ephemeral messaging applications to better prevent the loss of
important government records. Alternatively, since the government
owns Presidential records,14 a President’s use of ephemeral
messaging applications could be treated as the destruction of
government property.
This Article proceeds in five parts. Part II explains that the
Presidential Records Act, the Freedom of Information Act, and the
Federal Records Act are separate, although sometimes overlapping,
spheres with distinct rules governing the retention, preservation,
access, and disclosure of executive branch records. Part III defines
ephemeral messaging applications and describes how the use of
12

Matthew J. Hamilton & Donna L. Fisher, Ironically, Disappearing Message
Apps Are Here to Stay, NAT’L L. REV. (July 23, 2020),
https://www.natlawreview.com/article/ironically-disappearing-message-appsare-here-to-stay [https://perma.cc/RX6U-A629]; see also EXTERRO ET AL.,
JUDGES SURVEY 2020, 3 (2020) https://www.exterro.com/2020-judges-surveyediscovery [https://perma.cc/KG3U-F9SQ] (enter personal information; then
click “download this report now”) (“68% of judges feel ephemeral apps
(Snapchat, Instagram, etc.) represent the biggest future e-discovery risk.”); James
B. Comey, Dir., Fed. Bureau of Investigation, Going Dark: Are Technology,
Privacy, and Public Safety on a Collision Course? (Oct. 16, 2014),
https://www.fbi.gov/news/speeches/going-dark-are-technology-privacy-andpublic-safety-on-a-collision-course [https://perma.cc/CDC5-RRYL] (“We are
struggling to keep up with changing technology and to maintain our ability to
actually collect the communications we are authorized to intercept.”).
13
Citizens for Resp. & Ethics in Wash. (CREW) v. Cheney, 593 F. Supp. 2d
194, 198–99. (D.D.C. 2009) (explaining that “Congress limited the scope of
judicial review and provided little oversight authority for the President and Vice
President’s document preservation decisions,” thus, if there are “any deficiencies
in—or unintended consequences of—the PRA, that is an issue for Congress to
consider”).
14
MEGHAN M. STUESSY, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R46129, THE PRESIDENTIAL
RECORDS ACT: AN OVERVIEW 5 (2019), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/secrecy/
R46129.pdf [https://perma.cc/3TKS-QLED].
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these applications likely impacts the conservation of “Presidential
records,” given that Congress granted the President more
deference15 than federal agencies16 when drafting the Presidential
Records Act. Part IV highlights the inadequacies of the Presidential
Records Act by analyzing a recent legal battle regarding President
Trump’s use of ephemeral messaging applications. Part V illustrates
why the Presidential Records Act does not adequately preserve
Presidential records, thereby frustrating the Act’s purpose. Finally,
Part VI presents two potential solutions, as mentioned above, to
prevent a President from blocking the “sunshine” by using
ephemeral messaging applications.
II.
THE STATUTES GOVERNING FEDERAL RECORDS
Three separate Acts govern the retention, preservation, access,
and disclosure of records created by the executive branch: (1) the
Presidential Records Act (“PRA”),17 (2) the Federal Records Act
(“FRA”),18 and (3) the Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”).19 Put
simply, whether the PRA or the FRA applies to a record depends on
who created the record. “Agency records” are governed by the FRA
15
Armstrong v. Bush (Armstrong I), 924 F.2d 282, 290 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (“[T]he
PRA is one of the rare statutes that does impliedly preclude judicial review.”);
CREW, 593 F. Supp. 2d at 198 (“The PRA incorporates an assumption made by
Congress (in 1978) that subsequent Presidents and Vice Presidents would comply
with the Act in good faith, and therefore, Congress limited the scope of judicial
review and provided little oversight authority for the President and Vice
President’s document preservation decisions.”).
16
David S. Ferriero, NARA’s Role Under the Presidential Records Act and the
Federal Records Act, 49 PROLOGUE MAG., Summer 2017, https://www.archives.gov/
publications/prologue/2017/summer/archivist-pra-fra [https://perma.cc/2P23-TRES]
(“Under the PRA, NARA does not have direct oversight authority over the White House
records program, as it does over federal agencies under the FRA.”).
17
Presidential Records Act, 44 U.S.C. §§ 2201–09.
18
The FRA encompasses several statutes: Archival Administration, 44 U.S.C.
§§ 2101–20; Records Management by the Archivist of the United States and by
the Administrator of General Services, Id. §§ 2901–09; Records Management by
Federal Agencies, Id. §§ 3101–07 (1988); Disposal of Records, Id. §§ 3301–14.
Jessica de Perio Wittman, A Trend You Can’t Ignore: Social Media as
Government Records and Its Impact on the Interpretation of the Law, 31 ALB. L.J.
SCI. & TECH. 53, 71 n.77 (2021).
19
5 U.S.C. § 552.
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while “Presidential records” are governed by the PRA; therefore, no
federal record may simultaneously fall within both categories.20
Although the PRA and the FRA apply to different government
records, both Acts are strikingly similar because both require record
retention and preservation.21 Essentially, the PRA and the FRA
prevent the President and federal agencies from tossing official
records in the trash. The FOIA, on the other hand, mandates an
entirely different type of executive branch action: the FOIA requires
the federal government to disclose information.22 Because the duties
outlined in each of these three Acts are closely related,
understanding the nuances of these Acts and how they each interact
with one another is essential.
A. The Retention and Preservation of Agency Records Under the
Federal Records Act
The FRA broadly defines “records” to include “all recorded
information…made or received by a Federal agency under Federal
law or in connection with the transaction of public business.”23
When determining whether something should constitute an agency
record, the focus is on the content contained in the material,
“regardless of form or characteristics.”24 If the material reflects the
20
Armstrong v. Exec. Off. of the President (Armstrong III), 90 F.3d 553, 556
(D.C. Cir. 1996) (explaining that “no record is subject to both the FRA and PRA”).
21
James D. Lewis, White House Electronic Mail and Federal Recordkeeping
Law: Press “D” to Delete History, 93 MICH. L. REV. 794, 799 (1995) (“On the
one hand, the government must manage information, which includes the creation,
retention, and disposal of records in order to carry out and document government
activities; the FRA and the PRA regulate these information management
practices. On the other hand, the government must also disclose information to
the public; the FOIA regulates this duty to disclose.”).
22
Joshua Jacobson, The Secretary’s Emails: The Intersection of Transparency,
Security, and Technology, 68 FLA. L. REV. 1441, 1447–51 (2016).
23
44 U.S.C. § 3301(a)(1)(A). Notably, the definitions of both Presidential and
federal records were expanded in 2014 to better encompass the various types of
electronic records produced by rapidly changing technology. STUESSY, supra note
14, at 2.
24
44 U.S.C. § 3301(a)(1)(A); STUESSY, supra note 14, at 2 (“As a result of the
Presidential and Federal Records Act Amendments of 2014, all government
records (both Presidential and federal) are assessed for preservation not by the
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“organization, functions, policies, decisions, procedures, operations,
or other activities of the United States Government” or contains
“informational value,” the material is a record under the FRA.25
The FRA imposes several other obligations on federal agencies.
For example, federal agencies must “make and preserve” records26
and “establish safeguards against the removal or loss of records.”27
Additionally, the Archivist (the Presidential appointee in charge of
the National Archives and Records Administration28) must
“promulgate standards, procedures, and guidelines with respect to
records management”29 and “conduct inspections or surveys of the
records and the records management programs and practices.”30
Notably, if the head of a federal agency or the Archivist becomes
aware of “any actual, impending, or threatened unlawful removal,
defacing, alteration, or destruction of records,”31 then the Archivist
must help the head of the agency recover the records by “assist[ing]
the head of the agency in initiating action through the Attorney
General for the recovery of records unlawfully removed and for
other redress provided by law.”32
B. The Access and Disclosure of Agency Records Under the
Freedom of Information Act
The FRA and the FOIA work hand-in-hand to govern when
federal agencies must retain and disclose records to the public.
While the FRA and the FOIA impose independent requirements,
possessing or controlling a federal record is quite obviously a
media used to store the information but rather by the content of the information
itself.”).
25
44 U.S.C. § 3301(a)(1)(A).
26
Id. § 3101.
27
Id. § 3105.
28
Id. § 2103(a).
29
Id. § 2904(c)(1).
30
Id. § 2904(c)(7).
31
Id. § 2905(a).
32
Id.; Lewis, supra note 21, at 802 n.53 (citing 44 U.S.C. § 2905(a) (1988)
(archivist duties) and 44 U.S.C. § 3106 (1988) (agency head duties)) (“The FRA
does not specify the range of actions the Attorney General may pursue after being
notified of the unlawful removal or destruction of records, but the FRA clearly
contemplates that the Attorney General may file a lawsuit.”).
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prerequisite for an agency to actually fulfill its disclosure duties
under the FOIA.33 Put simply, the FOIA only works if agencies are
retaining records, as required under the FRA, to subsequently
respond to any FOIA requests.34 For example, if an agency fails to
preserve certain records and thus deprives the public of the
unlawfully discarded information, an agency only violates the FRA
in such a scenario—not the FOIA; if no record is available to satisfy
a FOIA request, the agency is not unlawfully withholding any
records and is thereby acting in accordance with the FOIA.35 Further,
the FOIA never requires an agency to create documents in response
to a FOIA request because the FRA alone governs the creation and
retention of agency records.36
Notably, the FOIA does not give the public the right to access
every document an agency creates.37 The FOIA has nine exceptions
that allow agencies to avoid disclosing certain records.38 For
example, some records may be kept secret in the “interest of national
defense or foreign policy.”39 If a requester receives an “adverse
determination” (i.e., access to the requested records has been
33

Lewis, supra note 21, at 799 (“Though separate statutes govern these
management [duties under the FRA] and disclosure duties [under the FOIA], the
duties themselves are clearly interrelated: a duty to disclose a particular type of
information is meaningless without a corresponding duty to retain the information
in the first place.”).
34
See Jacobson, supra note 22, at 1451.
35
Id.
36
Wash. Post v. U.S. Dep’t. of State, 632 F. Supp. 607, 661 (D.D.C. 1986).
37
5 U.S.C. § 552(b).
38
Id. § 552(b).
39
Id. § 552(b)(1). The other exceptions shield agency records from disclosure
if the records are: (2) “related solely to the internal personnel rules and practices
of an agency,” (3) “specifically exempted from disclosure by statute” other than
the FOIA, (4) “trade secrets and commercial or financial information obtained
from a person and privileged or confidential,” (5) “inter-agency or intra-agency
memorandums or letters that would not be available by law to a party other than
an agency in litigation with the agency,” (6) “personnel and medical files and
similar files the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted
invasion of personal privacy,” (7) certain “records or information compiled for
law enforcement purposes,” (8) records relating to an agency responsible
“responsible for the regulation or supervision of financial institutions,” and (9)
“geological and geophysical information and data, including maps, concerning
wells.” Id. § 552(b)(2)–(9).
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denied), the requester has at least ninety days to appeal the decision
to the head of the agency.40 A requester may submit an appeal if they
have a good reason to believe an agency either falsely claimed that
the agency did not possess the requested records, unlawfully
withheld certain records that were responsive to the request, or
failed to adequately search for the records.41
C. The Retention and Preservation of Presidential Records Under
the Presidential Records Act
The PRA requires the President to preserve any records
concerning the President’s “activities, deliberations, decisions, and
policies” that “reflect the performance of the President’s
constitutional, statutory, or other official or ceremonial duties.”42
Additionally, the President must implement “records management
controls” and “take all such steps as may be necessary” to preserve
and maintain any records the President creates.43
The PRA governs any “documentary material” that is “created
or received by the President, the President’s immediate staff,” or any
entity whose “function is to advise or assist the President.”44 While
documentary material naturally includes documents and physical
forms of communication, it also encompasses “other electronic or
mechanical recordations, whether in analog, digital, or any other
form.”45 For example, e-mails are considered Presidential records.46
40

Id. § 552(a)(6)(A)(i)(III)(aa).
Filing a Department of the Interior FOIA Appeal, U.S. DEP’T OF INTERIOR,
https://www.doi.gov/foia/appeals [https://perma.cc/KS4T-CCRY] (providing a
list of reasons why FOIA requesters may appeal the Department of the Interior’s
decision concerning a FOIA request, which are the same reasons requesters may
appeal FOIA decisions from any federal agency).
42
44 U.S.C. § 2203(a).
43
Id.
44
Id. § 2201(2).
45
Id. § 2201(1).
46
Id. § 2911. These recently enacted e-mail retention protocols are specific and
time sensitive. All e-mails must be retained, and any e-mail related to “official
business” must be transferred to the government recording device within 20 days
after the e-mail has been sent. See also CREW, CREW Sues President Trump over
Presidential Records (June 22, 2017) https://www.citizensforethics.org/pressrelease/crew-sues-president-trump-presidential-records/
[https://perma.cc/NM3Y-MUK6].
41
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Similarly, President Obama considered his tweets Presidential
records and auto-archived all of his Twitter posts.47 However, the
PRA does not require the President to maintain or disclose “personal
records,”48 which are those documentary materials that are “purely
private or nonpublic” and are not related to any of the President’s
official duties.49 “[D]iaries, journals, or other personal notes” are
personal records as long as the materials are “not prepared or utilized
for, or circulated or communicated in the course of, transacting
Government business.”50
The President may only dispose of documentary materials if the
records “no longer have administrative, historical, informational, or
evidentiary value” and the President obtains approval from the
Archivist.51 If the President wishes to dispose of any Presidential
documents, the President must (1) obtain a written copy of the
Archivist’s views concerning the disposal, and (2) verify that the
Archivist does not intend to bring the matter before Congress.52 The
Archivist is authorized to seek advice from Committees in the House
of Representatives and the Senate concerning the disposal of any
record that “may be of special interest to Congress” or is “in the
public interest.”53
Accordingly, under the statute’s plain language, the President is
seemingly prohibited from unilaterally deciding to discard
information without first ensuring that the public interest would not
be thwarted. However, just because the President must ask for the
Archivist’s “views” before disposing of any records does not mean
47
Rachel Treisman, As President Trump Tweets and Deletes, The Historical
Record Takes Shape, NPR (Oct. 25, 2019, 9:17 AM) https://www.npr.org
/2019/10/25/772325133/as-president-trump-tweets-and-deletes-the-historicalrecord-takes-shape [https://perma.cc/P4TV-X6EQ].
48
44 U.S.C. § 2201(3).
49
Id. § 2201(3).
50
Id.
51
44 U.S.C. § 2203(c). The Archivist is the head of the National Archives and
Records Administration (“NARA”). STUESSY, supra note 14, at 2.
52
44 U.S.C. § 2203(c), (e).
53
Id. § 2203(e). More specifically, before disposal, the Archivist must seek
advice from the following congressional committees: the Committee on Rules and
Administration, Governmental Affairs of the Senate, House Oversight, and
Government Operations of the House of Representatives. Id.
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the President must take the Archivist’s advice.54 Further, the PRA
essentially relies on the honor system because, if a President chooses
not to comply with the PRA, there is no enforcement mechanism to
bring the President into compliance.55
D. The Public’s Long Road to Accessing Presidential Records
The FOIA allows individuals to request records from an
“agency,”56 which does not include the President, the Office of the
President, or any entity in close proximity to the President that lacks
authority “independent from the President.”57 Thus, while a
President is in office, the public cannot request any materials to
verify that a President is indeed retaining Presidential records.58
Nevertheless, understanding the FOIA’s relationship with the
PRA is important for two reasons. First, at least one President has
attempted to use the PRA to prevent agency documents from being

54

44 U.S.C. § 2203(c); see also Deb Riechmann, Will Trump’s Mishandling of
Records Leave a Hole in History?, AP NEWS (Jan. 16, 2021),
https://apnews.com/article/donald-trump-technology-politics-vladimir-putin-russia65748b70e3cf3f7eecffa265da9ccae7
[https://perma.cc/7QPV-G495]
(“The
Presidential Records Act states that a [P]resident cannot destroy records until he seeks
the advice of the national archivist and notifies Congress. But the law doesn’t require
him to heed the archivist’s advice. It doesn’t prevent the [P]resident from going ahead
and destroying records.”).
55
See Armstrong v. Exec. Off. of the President, Off. of Admin. (Armstrong II),
1 F.3d 1274, 1291–93 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (citing Armstrong v. Bush (Armstrong I),
924 F.2d 282, 290 (D.C. Cir. 1991)) (explaining that “disposal decisions under
the PRA are unreviewable” and thus “neither the Archivist nor the Congress has
the authority to veto the President’s disposal decision”).
56
5 U.S.C. § 551(1).
57
Armstrong v. Exec. Off. of the President, Off. of Admin. (Armstrong III), 90
F.3d 553, 567 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (finding that the National Security Council is
“more like ‘the President’s immediate personal staff’ than it is like an agency
exercising authority, independent of the President,” and therefore is not an agency
under the FOIA) (quoting Meyer v. Bush, 981 F.2d 1288, 1293 (D.C. Cir. 1993)).
58
Armstrong II, 1 F.3d at 1292–93 (“Congress was ‘keenly aware of the
separation of powers concerns that were implicated by legislation regulating the
conduct of the President’s daily operations,’ and thus sought ‘to minimize outside
interference with the day-to-day operations of the President and his closest
advisors and to ensure executive branch control over [P]residential records during
the President’s term of office.’”) (quoting Armstrong I, 924 F.2d at 290).
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released to the public via FOIA requests.59 In Armstrong II,60 the
plaintiffs61 argued the guidelines designating whether a
“documentary material” constituted a Presidential record were
drawn too broadly.62 Those guidelines allowed every document
received by certain agency officials to be shielded from the public.63
The plaintiffs asserted that at least some of the records those
agencies created should be governed by the FRA and thus
immediately subject to FOIA requests.64
After reviewing the legislative history of the PRA, the
Armstrong II court found that Congress intended for the PRA to only
include those records that are not subject to the FOIA.65 In other
words, the FOIA’s definition of whether a material constitutes an
agency record trumps whether a material is a Presidential record

59

Id. at 1294 (holding that several agencies’ recordkeeping guidelines “violate
the PRA to the extent that they classify as [P]residential records materials that
would otherwise be subject to the FOIA”); see also Citizens for Resp. & Ethics in
Wash. (CREW) v. Trump, 302 F. Supp. 3d 127, 135 (D.D.C. 2018) (citing
Armstrong II, 1 F.3d at 1290) (explaining that the Executive Office of the
President during the H. W. Bush Administration “issu[ed] guidelines that
improperly instructed federal agencies to treat agency records as [P]residential
records and thereby shield[ed] them from immediate release under FOIA”).
60
Armstrong II, 1 F.3d at 1274.
61
The plaintiffs included Scott Armstrong, the National Security Archivist, and
several other researchers and nonprofit organizations. See Citizens for Resp. &
Ethics in Wash. v. Cheney, 593 F. Supp. 2d 194, 213 (D.D.C. 2009) (“The
Armstrong line of cases began in 1989 when several individuals and organizations
sought to prevent the destruction of materials created during the last two weeks
of the Reagan Administration and stored on a National Security Archive computer
system, alleging that the records had to be maintained pursuant to the Federal
Records Act (“FRA”) or the PRA.”).
62
Armstrong II, 1 F.3d at 1291–92.
63
Id.
64
Id.
65
Id. at 1294 (explaining that the PRA explicitly exempts any records subject
to the FOIA from its reach, and the FOIA uses the Administrative Procedure Act’s
definition of “agency”); 44 U.S.C. § 2201(2)(B); 44 U.S.C. § 552(f); 5 U.S.C.
§ 551(1).
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under the PRA.66 Although the PRA precludes judicial review,67
courts have an “indispensable role in ensuring proper government
disclosure under the FOIA.”68 Therefore, it is essential that a
President’s designation of records does not become a “[P]residential
carte blanche to shield materials from the reach of the FOIA” and
judicial review.69 If advising the President was not the agency
official’s “sole responsibility,” at least some of the records the
agency made and received were agency records, not Presidential
ones.70 Thus, the agency’s decision to consider every record a
“Presidential” one—effectively insulating the record from the
public’s reach for many years—was improper.71
Second, the PRA and the FOIA are interrelated because
Presidential records may eventually become subject to FOIA
requests, even though Presidential records are not subject to FOIA
requests while the President is in office.72 When enacting the PRA,
Congress wanted to “minimize outside interference with the day-today-operations of the President and his closest advisors” and
“ensure executive branch control over Presidential records during
the President’s term in office.”73 Thus, only after the President
leaves office will all of the documentary materials created
66

Armstrong II, 1 F.3d at 1292.
Id. at 1292–93 (“Congress was ‘keenly aware of the separation of powers
concerns that were implicated by legislation regulating the conduct of the
President’s daily operations,’ and thus sought ‘to minimize outside interference
with the day-to-day operations of the President and his closest advisors and to
ensure executive branch control over [P]residential records during the President’s
term of office.’”) (quoting Armstrong v. Bush (Armstrong I), 924 F.2d 282, 290
(D.C. Cir. 1991)).
68
Id. at 1292.
69
Id.
70
Id.
71
Id.
72
See DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FOIA Update: FOIA Memo on White House Records
(Jan. 1, 1993), https://www.justice.gov/oip/blog/foia-update-foia-memo-whitehouse-records [https://perma.cc/E9HV-YCES] (“This means, among other things,
that the parts of the Executive Office of the President that are known as the ‘White
House Office’ are not subject to the FOIA; certain other parts of the Executive
Office of the President are.”); David Cohen, FOIA in the Executive Office of the
President, 21 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 203, 206 (2018).
73
Armstrong I, 924 F.2d at 290 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
67

OCT. 2021]

Ephemeral Messaging Apps

181

throughout their term be turned over to the National Archives and
Records Administration (“NARA”).74
Additionally, even after a President leaves office and turns over
their records to the NARA, private citizens must still wait years to
access the records created throughout a President’s term.75
Generally, Presidential records are subject to FOIA requests five
years after the Archivist has either obtained custody of the records
or completely processed and organized the records (whichever date
is earlier).76 However, if the information contained in the record falls
within certain exceptions,77 public access may be restricted for up to
twelve years.78 These statutory restrictions mean that any records
created during the initial months of a two-term President’s eight
years in office will be withheld from the public for thirteen to twenty
years. Thus, a President may escape the political consequences for
any failure to preserve Presidential records because that failure is
undiscoverable until after a President has left office.79
74

44 U.S.C. § 2203(g) (2018); NATIONAL ARCHIVES, Presidential Records Act,
https://www.archives.gov/presidential-libraries/laws/1978-act.html
[https://perma.cc/PX6Z-BW6Z].
75
44 U.S.C. § 2204(a).
76
Id. § 2204(b)(2).
77
Before leaving office, the President may specify a duration, which is “not to
exceed 12 years,” during which access to certain Presidential records may be
restricted. 44 U.S.C. § 2204(a). However, the record must be: (1) “specifically
authorized under criteria established by an Executive order to be kept secret in the
interest of national defense or foreign policy,” (2) related to “Federal office”
appointments, (3) specifically exempted by another statute that “leaves no
discretion on the issue” and “establishes particular criteria” or “types of material”
to be withheld,” (4) “trade secrets and commercial or financial information
obtained from a person and privileged or confidential,” (5) “confidential
communications requesting or submitting advice, between the President and the
President’s advisers, or between such advisers,” or (6) “personnel and medical
files and similar files the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly
unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.” Id.
78
Id. § 2204(a).
79
Armstrong v. Exec. Off. of the President, Off. of Admin. (Armstrong III), 90
F.3d 553, 556 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (explaining that (1) while both the PRA and the
FRA require document retention and preservation, the procedures delineated in
the FRA are more demanding, and (2) although agencies that fail to follow the
FRA are subject to judicial review, the decisions of a President who fails to
comply with the PRA is not reviewable by a court).
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III.
EPHEMERAL MESSAGING APPLICATIONS
Ephemeral messaging applications (“apps”) present a unique
threat to preserving Presidential records under the PRA for two
reasons. First, because messages sent on ephemeral messaging apps
erase themselves,80 the President is deprived of any chance to obtain
the Archivist’s advice before disposing of ephemeral messages.81
Second, the structure of the PRA insulates Presidential records from
between five and twenty years after their creation, so the public
cannot assess whether any information is missing until a substantial
period of time has passed.82 This gap between the creation of a
Presidential record and its disclosure to the public is alarming
considering the FOIA practices by federal agencies—which are
monitored more closely than the President and granted less
deference by courts.83
A. Ephemeral Messaging Apps: Defined and Explained
Ephemeral messaging apps are electronic platforms that allow
users to send messages that “delete by default.”84 In other words,
users can send messages, knowing the messages will be deleted
shortly after the recipient views the message.85 Some ephemeral
messaging apps delete messages immediately after the recipient

80

PC MAG., supra note 1.
44 U.S.C. § 2203(c), (e).
82
Id. § 2204; see supra Part II.D (explaining the significant period of time
between when a Presidential record is created and when it finally becomes subject
to FOIA requests).
83
Armstrong v. Exec. Off. of the President, Off. of Admin. (Armstrong II), 1
F.3d 1274, 1292 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (citing Armstrong v. Bush (Armstrong I), 924
F.2d 282, 290 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
84
Nathan C. Ranns, Gone in A Snap?: The Effect of 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) Fixation
Precedents on Ephemeral Messaging Platforms, 45 AIPLA Q.J. 255, 256 (2017)
(referencing statements made by Evan Spiegel, the CEO and co-founder of Snap,
Inc., in Snapchat’s initial public offering (“IPO”) video about Snapchat’s
preference for a “delete by default” system).
85
PC MAG., supra note 1.
81
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opens them.86 Other apps delete messages after a predefined period
of time, ranging from several seconds to twenty-four hours.87
The ephemeral nature of these messages has given them a variety of
nicknames, such as “vanishing messages”88 or “self-destructing
messages.”89 In a speech about how “data encryption” apps90 shield
law enforcement officers from accessing the information exchanged
on encrypted apps, Former FBI Director James Comey termed the
use of such specialized messaging apps as “going dark.”91 The
decision to use ephemeral messaging apps is often called “going
dark” because the information exchanged on ephemeral messaging
platforms is difficult—if not impossible—for the government to

86
Philip J. Favro & Keith A. Call, A New Frontier in Ediscovery Ethics: SelfDestructing Messaging Applications, UTAH B.J. (March/April 2018), at 40,
https://www.utahbar.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/Mar_Apr_2018_FINAL.pdf
[https://perma.cc/26A8-C8XJ].
87
Id.
88
Stewart, supra note 11, at 2.
89
Favro & Call, supra note 86, at 40.
90
See David Nield & Brian Turner, Best Encrypted Instant Messaging Apps of 2021
for Android, TECHRADAR (Jan. 13, 2021), https://www.techradar.com/best/
best-encrypted-messaging-app-android [https://perma.cc/4VZ8-49EP] (explaining
the basic functions of data encryption apps and listing five of the best encrypted
messaging apps).
91
Comey, supra note 12 (“[T]he law hasn’t kept pace with technology, and this
disconnect has created a significant public safety problem. We call it ‘Going
Dark,’ and what it means is this: Those charged with protecting our people aren’t
always able to access the evidence we need to prosecute crime and prevent
terrorism even with lawful authority.”); see also Steven Nelson, Comey:
Encrypted Messaging Not Needed to Block Mass Surveillance, U.S. NEWS (July
8, 2015, 4:41 PM), https://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2015/07/08/comeyencrypted-messaging-not-needed-to-block-mass-surveillance (“Sen. Mike Lee,
R-Utah, suggested to Comey consumers are worried about someone without a
warrant accessing their communications.”).
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obtain.92 Further, several ephemeral messaging apps also provide
data encryption capabilities, so the distinction is mainly semantic.93

Figure 1.94
92
Stewart, supra note 11, at 3. Stewart discusses how government employees
“appear to be ‘going dark’ in their communications as part of their official jobs.”
Id. However, while government officials may have gone dark in the past,
government officials’ use of Snapchat and Confide, which are ephemeral
messaging apps, present additional problems aside from the encryption itself. The
use of such applications has the “potential to be deadly to public records laws,
providing an easy way for government officials to dodge public scrutiny without
any trace of their subversion.” Id. at 3.
93
See Nield & Turner, supra note 90 (including Signal, Whatsapp, and
Telegram in its list of data encryption apps); see also William D. Semins et al.,
The Compliance Risk Facing Companies that Use Chat Apps, LAW360 (June 16,
2020), https://www.law360.com/articles/1282305/the-compliance-risks-facingcompanies-that-use-chat-apps [https://perma.cc/B2TG-4SQP] (“Many of these
applications—in addition to being ephemeral in nature—are end-to-end
encrypted.”).
94
Sean Broderick, Ephemeral Messaging Apps, NAT’L LITIG. SUPPORT BLOG
(Sep. 14, 2020), https://nlsblog.org/2020/09/14/ephemeral-messaging-apps/
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Snapchat is perhaps the first ephemeral messaging app to gain
widespread popularity.95 Other examples of ephemeral messaging
apps include: Confide,96 Telegram, Hash, Signal,97 Cover Me,
Whatsapp, and Wickr.98 Over time, the list of ephemeral messaging
apps will likely continue to grow, as Snapchat’s “deliberately

[https://perma.cc/C3L7-ASPT]. Short Message Service (“SMS”) texts are the
traditional form of text messages that utilize cellphone tower infrastructure and
are not encrypted. Zak Doffman, Why You Should Stop Sending SMS Messages—
Even On Apple iMessage, FORBES (Aug. 8, 2020, 7:20 AM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/zakdoffman/2020/08/08/apple-iphone-ipad-imessagesecurity-update-sms-rcs-google-whatsapp-encryption/?sh=6aea04de5b4d
[https://perma.cc/J4KK-WBYT]. While messages sent using Apple’s iMessage
application are end-to-end encrypted, these messages are not the “ubiquitous,”
“plaintext short-form messages” that can be sent from traditional “un-smart”
phones. Id. Further, iMessage occasionally reverts to sending SMS texts (which
are not encrypted) when a data network is unavailable, or the message’s recipient
does not have an Apple device. Id. Phones utilizing an Android operating system
are only encrypted on the front-end, meaning a message’s content is encrypted
between the device sending the message and the device’s server, but not the
recipient. Id.
95
Brian O’Connell, History of Snapchat: Timeline and Facts, THE STREET
(Feb. 28, 2020, 3:35 PM), https://www.thestreet.com/technology/history-ofsnapchat [https://perma.cc/HM8Q-NLH2] (explaining that Snapchat first entered
app stores in 2011 and, not even a decade later, is “one of the most widely used
social media platforms in the world”).
96
Confide, https://getconfide.com/ [https://perma.cc/2DVW-88WA]. Confide
markets itself as a company that protects the privacy of its users, promising a cloak
of secrecy around any messages that are sent using its platform: “With encrypted,
self-destructing, and screenshot-proof messages, Confide gives you the comfort
of knowing that your private communication will now truly stay that way.” Id.
97
See Jordan McMahon, Ditch All Those Other Messaging Apps: Here’s Why You
Should Use Signal, WIRED (Nov. 5, 2017, 08:00 AM), https://www.wired.com/
story/ditch-all-those-other-messaging-apps-heres-why-you-should-use-signal/ [https://
perma.cc/C8LJ-M3LR] (“The thing that actually makes Signal superior is that it’s
easy to ensure that the contents of every chat remain private and unable to be read
by anyone else.”).
98
See Thomas J. Kelly & Jason R. Baron, The Rise of Ephemeral Messaging Apps in
the Business World, NAT’L L. REV. (Apr. 23, 2019), https://www.natlawreview.com/
article/rise-ephemeral-messaging-apps-business-world [https://perma.cc/2DMZYXSN].
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ephemeral” business model99 has demonstrated the market’s demand
for these platforms and paved the way for similar applications to
follow.100 For instance, Facebook’s Messenger and Instagram now
mimic several of Snapchat’s ephemeral messaging features to
compete with Snapchat among younger demographics.101
The market demand for ephemeral messaging apps is not always
nefariously motivated. One reason for the growing number of
ephemeral messaging apps is the public’s desire for privacy and
general fear of an overly intrusive government.102 Another reason is
that ephemeral messaging apps save businesses from spending an

99

See Felix Salmon, How Snapchat Is Sending #MeToo Down the Memory
Hole, https://www.wired.com/story/snapchat-sending-metoo-down-the-memoryhole/ [https://perma.cc/VM7C-2P9W] (noting that “a growing subset of
Snapchat-inspired messaging apps is deliberately ephemeral, with
communications self-destructing after 24 hours or even immediately upon
receipt”).
100
Id. See also Sean Broderick, Ephemeral Messaging Apps, NAT’L LITIG.
SUPPORT BLOG (Sep. 14, 2020), https://nlsblog.org/2020/09/14/ephemeralmessaging-apps/ [https://perma.cc/C3L7-ASPT] (“Although these apps were
initially only used by teenagers, they are now a ubiquitous part of corporate
culture.”).
101
See Nick Statt, Facebook’s Vanish Mode on Messenger and Instagram Lets
You Send Disappearing Messages, THE VERGE, (Nov. 12, 2020, 2:00 PM),
https://www.theverge.com/2020/11/12/21561286/facebook-vanish-modelaunch-instagram-messenger-disappearing-snapchat
[https://perma.cc/D9Q9P3ZM] (“While Snapchat popularized ephemeral messaging among US teens
with Stories and its DM design, Facebook has since adopted many of its rival’s
features and implemented them throughout Messenger, Instagram, and WhatsApp
for users of all age groups around the world.”).
102
Id. (“And while some people, still, might think it cool to live in a Black
Mirror episode where all past communications can be called up and replayed at
will, most of us, including Black Mirror’s creators, would consider such a service
to be the chilling manifestation of a feared dystopian panopticon.”); Nelson, supra
note 91; see Mara Gay, Messaging App Has Bipartisan Support Amid Hacking
Concerns, THE WALL ST. J. (Jan. 24, 2017), https://www.wsj.com/articles/
messaging-app-has-bipartisan-support-amid-hacking-concerns-1485215028
[https://perma.cc/DE6L-2DRJ] (“[Signal, an ephemeral messaging] app is also
popular among activist types seeking to avoid surveillance from government
agencies or others who may be listening in.”).
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exorbitant amount of money storing unnecessary personal data,
which only increases the risk of security breaches.103
B. Are Ephemeral Messages Presidential Records?
Ephemeral messages should be considered “documentary
materials” under the existing legal framework found in the PRA for
several reasons. First, whether or not documentary material falls
within the PRA’s purview depends on the content of the
communication rather than the medium through which the
communication was sent.104 This shift was announced in the 2014
PRA amendments, which updated the PRA and the FRA to include
new types of electronic communications.105 Second, the PRA
specifies that, along with papers and other written materials,
“documentary material” includes “audio and visual records, or other
electronic or mechanical recordations, whether in analog, digital, or
any other form.”106 Given that ephemeral messages are
communications via “electronic recordations”—or, at the very least,
another “form” of electronic recordations—ephemeral messages
easily fall within such an expansive definition. Lastly, dicta in a
recent court ruling, opining that a President’s use of such messages
“would almost certainly run afoul of the Presidential Records Act,”
suggests that ephemeral messaging apps fall under the scope of the

103

See William Semins et al., The Compliance Risk Facing Companies that Use Chat
Apps, LAW360 (June 16, 2020) https://www.law360.com/articles/1282305/
the-compliance-risks-facing-companies-that-use-chat-apps [https://perma.cc/B2TG4SQP].
104
Jeremy Gordon, What Rules Apply to Government Records During a Presidential
Transition?, LAWFARE (Dec. 9, 2020, 10:22 AM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/whatrules-apply-government-records-during-presidential-transition [https://perma.cc/8P3H3Z7A]; see WENDY GINSBERG, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R40238, THE PRESIDENTIAL
RECORDS ACT: BACKGROUND AND RECENT ISSUES FOR CONGRESS 5 (2014),
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/secrecy/R40238.pdf [https://perma.cc/3NXG-BASW] (“Federal
statute would seem to suggest that the sender and content of the message created on an
electronic messaging account would determine whether the message qualified as a
[P]residential record.”).
105
Id. at 102.
106
44 U.S.C. § 2201(1).
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PRA.107 In short, as long as the content of an ephemeral message is
related to the President’s “constitutional, statutory, or other official
or ceremonial duties,”108 the message will almost certainly be
considered a Presidential record under the PRA.109
C. The Ephemeral Messaging App Problem
Congress has expressed doubt over whether federal agencies are
complying with FOIA requests,110 and reports have indicated that
noncompliance is getting worse.111 According to an Associated Press
article analyzing FOIA request data, the federal government
“censored, withheld[,] or said it couldn’t find records” more times
in the first eight months of President Trump’s term than at any point
in the prior decade.112 More generally, the government responded
with censored files or, worse, nothing at all in 78% of all FOIA
requests submitted in the last ten years.113 For requests where the
government declined to hand over any records, the government

107

Citizens for Resp. & Ethics in Wash. (“CREW”) v. Trump, 302 F. Supp. 3d
127, 129 (D.D.C. 2018), aff’d, 924 F.3d 602 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (emphasis added).
The plaintiffs also alleged that Trump violated the Take Care Clause of the
Constitution. Id. at 129.
108
44 U.S.C. § 2201(3).
109
CREW, 302 F. Supp. 3d at 129.
110
See Lauren Harper, Rep. Chaffetz Tells Fed FOIA Head Melanie Pustay that
She Lives in “La-La-Land” if She Thinks FOIA is Working Properly, and Much
More, UNREDACTED (June 14, 2015), https://unredacted.com/2015/06/04/repchaffetz-tells-fed-foia-head-melanie-pustay-that-she-lives-in-la-la-land-if-she-thinksfoia-is-working-properly-and-much-more-frinformsum-642015/ [https://perma.cc/FZ
Q5-L9AT]. In 2015, the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform
held a hearing called “Ensuring Transparency through the Freedom of
Information Act.” Id. During that hearing, Chairman Jason Chaffetz informed the
DOJ’s Office of Information Policy Director, Melanie Pustay, that Pustay had to
be “living in la-la-land” if Pustay seriously believed the FOIA was properly
administered. Id.
111
Ted Bridis, US Sets New Record for Censoring, Withholding Gov’t Files,
AP NEWS (Mar. 12, 2018), https://apnews.com/714791d91d7944e49a284a
51fab65b85/US-sets-new-record-for-censoring,-withholding-gov%27t-files
[https://perma.cc/US5H-EUH2].
112
Id.
113
Id.
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reportedly could not find any records for slightly more than half of
those requests.114
Nevertheless, as Nate Jones, the Director of the FOIA Project
for the National Security Archive, explains, the “government is
actually pretty good about [proactively] giving information out that
it wants to.”115 While Jones’ point is a positive one, the corollary is
that the government may be slow to disclose information
detrimental to the government or may never disclose the information
at all.116 For example, in mid-2018 the Environmental Protection
Agency (“EPA”) had a ten-year backlog of FOIA requests.117 The
information eventually obtained from those FOIA requests
produced some of the “most damning allegations” against Scott
Pruitt, the EPA Administrator who later resigned amid a scandal.118
Thus, agencies may intentionally slow down their responses to
certain FOIA requests to avoid political backlash.
Generally, an agency’s decision to deny FOIA requests or
withhold a large number of records is alarming given the typical
outcomes of FOIA appeals.119 When FOIA requesters appeal an
114
Id. Questions often arise about whether the government made an honest or
reasonable effort when searching for a FOIA request or if government officials
simply glanced around the room. See JPat Brown, FOIA FAQ: What to Do When
an Agency Claims Not to Have Records You Know it Has, MUCKROCK (Sept. 6,
2018),
https://www.muckrock.com/news/archives/2018/sep/06/foia-faq-nrd-wtf/
[https://perma.cc/HHB6-QXKT].
115
Michael Morisy, Requester’s Voice: Nate Jones, MUCKROCK (Feb. 19,
2016), https://www.muckrock.com/news/archives/2016/feb/19/requesters-voicenate-jones/ [https://perma.cc/MM2A-X8TH] (emphasis added).
116
Ellen Knickmeyer, The Latest: Scrutiny of ‘Politically Charged’ FOIA
Requests, AP NEWS (July 13, 2018), https://apnews.com/5011ec08abf1403cb3
1dc616f12ef595/The-Latest:-Scrutiny-of-%27politically-charged%27-FOIArequests [https://perma.cc/5QDM-YVXY].
117
Id.
118
Id. (detailing how the EPA assigns “politically charged” FOIA requests for
special review and the EPA’s subsequent denial of intentionally slowing down its
response to such requests).
119
Federal Government Sets New Record for Censoring, Withholding Files
Under FOIA, CBS NEWS (Mar. 12, 2018, 2:40 PM), https://www.cbsnews.com
/news/foia-federal-government-sets-new-record-for-censoring-withholding-filestrump-administration/ [https://perma.cc/Y3RK-GEZ4].
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agency’s decision, more than one-third of those appeals reveal that
the government improperly tried to withhold information.120
However, only 4.3% of FOIA requesters file an appeal when the
government responds with redacted material or withholds
documents under one of the FOIA’s nine exceptions.121 If the trends
demonstrated by this data hold true for the entire population of
FOIA requesters, the government fails to disclose information for
approximately one out of every three FOIA requests.
While the problems outlined above involve FOIA requests and
therefore focus on agency behavior, these issues highlight an
important theme: the government generally favors nondisclosure.122
This governmental tendency to hide information is especially
concerning when questions arise regarding the President’s
compliance with the PRA, as Congress gave the President greater
leniency and more deference than federal agencies when drafting the
PRA.123 For instance, while courts have an active role “in ensuring
proper government disclosure under the FOIA,”124 “disposal
decisions under the PRA are unreviewable.”125 Further, unlike the
FRA, “[n]either the Archivist nor an agency head can initiate any
action through the Attorney General to effect recovery or ensure
preservation of [P]residential records” if records are being

120

Id.
See id.
122
See Nick Schwellenbach & Sean Moulton, The “Most Abused” Freedom of
Information Act Exemption Still Needs to Be Reined In, POGO (Feb. 6, 2020),
https://www.pogo.org/analysis/2020/02/the-most-abused-foia-exemption-stillneeds-to-be-reined-in/ [https://perma.cc/C2SM-XRCH].
123
Armstrong v. Exec. Off. of the President, Off. of Admin. (Armstrong II), 1
F.3d 1274, 1292 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (citing Armstrong v. Bush (Armstrong I), 924
F.2d 282, 290 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (“Congress was ‘keenly aware of the separation
of powers concerns that were implicated by legislation regulating the conduct of
the President’s daily operations,’ and thus sought ‘to minimize outside
interference with the day-to-day operations of the President and his closest
advisors and to ensure executive branch control over [P]residential records during
the President’s term of office.’”); Armstrong v. Exec. Off. of the President
(Armstrong III), 90 F.3d 553, 556 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
124
Armstrong II, 1 F.3d at 1292.
125
Id. at 1293 (citing Armstrong I, 924 F.2d at 290).
121
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destroyed.126 Thus, at present, neither the courts nor American
citizens can prevent a President from destroying Presidential
records.127
This problem is aggravated by the amount of time that passes
before the public realizes what information is missing. Suppose the
public wants to access certain Presidential records to investigate one
of the President’s recent decisions. Unfortunately, the public must
wait a minimum of five years after the President leaves office for
that information to become subject to a FOIA request.128 Then, the
public has to wait an additional, unknown period of time for the
Archivist or the appropriate Presidential Library129 to process and
respond to the request.130 On the other hand, agency records are
subject to FOIA requests immediately after agency records are
created, although requesting individuals must similarly wait for the
agency to respond to their inquiry.131

126
Id. at 1291 (comparing the disposal protocols under the PRA with the actions
agency heads and the Archivist can take to “seek legal action through the Attorney
General to recover or preserve the records” that are being destroyed, described in
44 U.S.C. § 3106 and § 2905(a)).
127
See id. at 1293 (citing Armstrong I, 924 F.2d at 290).
128
44 U.S.C. § 2204(b)(2).
129
Access to Presidential Records (Jan. 22, 2021), DIGIT. MEDIA L. PROJECT,
https://www.dmlp.org/legal-guide/access-presidential-records
[https://perma.cc/SKM5-3ZQH].
130
Good News and Bad News on FOIA Responsiveness, THE FOIA PROJECT
(Jan. 26, 2016), http://foiaproject.org/2016/01/26/good-news-and-bad-news-onfoia-responsiveness/ [https://perma.cc/G3TK-5ATK] (highlighting the general
wait times for different government agencies); JPat Brown, What Ever Happened
to that State Department FOIA from Hell?, MUCKROCK (Nov. 28, 2018),
https://www.muckrock.com/news/archives/2018/nov/28/what-ever-happenedstate-department-foia-hell/ [https://perma.cc/35VR-SXDH] (explaining how one
of their writers waited four and a half years for a two-page FOIA response).
131
While some agency records are excluded from the FOIA (such as
information related to an ongoing criminal investigation), no limitations exist
regarding when an individual may request agency records once records are
created. 5 U.S.C. § 552; see also FOIA.GOV, (last visited Apr. 12, 2021),
https://www.foia.gov/faq.html [https://perma.cc/J5GJ-33SA].
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The use of ephemeral messaging apps further exacerbates these
problems.132 Ephemeral messaging apps destroy information as soon
as the information is received or shortly thereafter,133 thereby
denying the public of the possibility to ever request those records.134
Recognizing the threat that ephemeral messaging apps pose, the
NARA published a bulletin titled “Guidance on Managing
Electronic Messages,” including Snapchat and WhatsApp on the list
of electronic messaging apps subject to the FRA.135 Even though
these apps are more likely to “contain transitory information or
information of value for a much shorter period of time,” agencies
are still required to “capture and manage these records.”136 While
132

See GINSBERG, supra note 104, at 1 (“Presidents from both major political
parties have faced questions and concerns about their abilities to maintain
accurate, comprehensive, and accessible archives, especially considering their
increasing use of electronic—and perhaps ephemeral—platforms like e-mail,
Facebook, Twitter, blogs, and YouTube.”); see also Complaint at 2, Citizens for
Resp. and Ethics in Wash. (“CREW”) v. Trump, 302 F. Supp. 3d 127 (D.D.C.
2018) (No. 17 Civ. 01228), https://s3.amazonaws.com/storage.citizensforethics
.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/22122345/Complaint.pdf
[https://perma.cc/XCW8-3TMJ] [hereinafter CREW v. Trump Complaint]
(“Critical checks and balances are built into our system of government, including
those implemented through congressional and judicial oversight. The ability of
those checks and balances to work depends on the availability of a record of
President Trump’s actions.”).
133
PC MAG., supra note 1.
134
See CREW v. Trump Complaint, supra note 132, at 18–23; see also Jordan
Libowitz, CREW and American Oversight Request Trump Stop Destroying
Presidential Records, CITIZENS FOR ETHICS (June 14, 2018),
https://www.citizensforethics.org/press-release/crew-and-american-oversightrequest-trump-stop-destroying-presidential-records/ [https://perma.cc/4HYWDGPP] (“Trump’s practice of ripping up records isn’t just bizarre. It’s
representative of the [P]resident’s complete failure to grasp what it means to be a
public servant . . . The [P]resident’s counsel and staff need to put an immediate
end to Trump’s paper-tearing habit before we lose any more irreplaceable
historical records.”).
135
NARA, BULL. 2015-02 Guidance on Managing Electronic Messages, (July
29, 2015), https://www.archives.gov/records-mgmt/bulletins/2015/2015-02.html
[https://perma.cc/8HJB-LCVL].
136
Id. Enforcing a blanket prohibition against the use of all forms of ephemeral
messaging applications is too difficult to implement and ignores the ways
employees communicate. Id. Thus, the NARA suggested several options for
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this bulletin only applies to federal agencies, it demonstrates that
ephemeral messaging apps are inherently different than other forms
of communication and should be addressed independently in a
Presidential records policy.137
Finally, Presidents have recently been incentivized to use
ephemeral messaging apps. Indeed, news reports reveal that
prominent political leaders have used ephemeral messaging apps,
including President Obama, President Trump, and Secretary of State
Hillary Clinton.138 One of President Obama’s senior aides explained
in an interview that “everybody learned the lessons of the Clinton
campaign when it came to communicating about sensitive issues
over e-mail,” demonstrating politicians’ general fear of their internal
conversations being revealed to the public.139 According to the Wall
Street Journal, Democrats and Republicans have at least one thing
in common: a “singular goal to avoid a repeat of the WikiLeaks
scandal.”140
addressing the challenges in capturing the data from electronic messages, such as
training employees on how to identify and capture records. Id. Additionally,
agencies can “[c]onfigure electronic messaging systems to allow for automated
capture of electronic messages and metadata” or “[u]se third-party services to
capture messages.” Id.
137
The bulletin’s indented audience is the “Heads of Federal Agencies,” not the
President. Id. Additionally, as discussed, the FRA does not apply to the President.
138
Gay, supra note 102; see also Kaveh Waddell, The Risks of Sending Secret
Messages in the White House, THE ATLANTIC (Feb. 15, 2017),
https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2017/02/white-house-secretmessages/516792/ [https://perma.cc/VM9T-4G54]; Maya Kosoff, White House
Staffers Are Using a Secret App to Speak Freely, VANITY FAIR (Feb. 27, 2017),
http://www.vanityfair.com/news/2017/02/white-house-staffers-are-using-asecret-chat-app-to-speak-freely [https://perma.cc/8Z6D-7G3M].
139
Gay, supra note 102.
140
Id.; WikiLeaks, “a whistleblowing platform founded by Julian Assange,”
was created to distribute “classified documents and data sets from anonymous
sources and leakers.” Before the 2016 Presidential election, over 20,000 pages of
e-mails from Hillary Clinton’s campaign chair and the Democratic National
Convention were leaked. Francis Whittaker, What Is WikiLeaks? Everything You
Need to Know, NBC NEWS (Apr. 30, 2018, 10:24 AM),
https://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/smart-facts/what-wikileaks-everything-youneed-know-n869556 [https://perma.cc/GB9S-5THH]; Jeff Stein, What 20,000
Pages of Hacked WikiLeaks Emails Teach Us About Hillary Clinton, VOX (Oct.
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IV.

THE ROLE OF COURTS IN OVERSEEING A PRESIDENT’S
USE OF NEW COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY
In 2017, media reports revealed that President Trump might not
have complied with the PRA.141 Allegedly, White House staff
continuously used ephemeral messaging applications to
communicate, regardless of whether the messages related to official
White House business or the President’s official duties.142 The White
House neither confirmed nor denied that President Trump or any of
his staff used ephemeral apps to communicate yet firmly insisted the
White House’s policies complied with the PRA.143
In response to these news reports, Citizens for Responsibility
and Ethics in Washington (“CREW”) and the National Security
Archives, two watchdog organizations that frequently initiate
lawsuits to hold government officials accountable,144 brought a suit
against President Trump.145 The plaintiffs alleged that the White
House’s use of ephemeral messaging apps violated the PRA and
sought mandamus relief.146 Their claims were centered around two
arguments: (1) Armstrong II established that policies delineating
which records are subject to the PRA are subject to judicial review,
and (2) the PRA creates a clear and compelling duty for Presidents
to implement record management and retention protocols.147
The plaintiffs first argued that the court’s ruling in Armstrong II
“establishe[d] a clear dichotomy: record creation, management, and
disposal decisions are not reviewable, but record classification
20, 2016, 9:30 AM), https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2016/10/20/
13308108/wikileaks-podesta-hillary-clinton [https://perma.cc/238T-UN5U].
141
CREW v. Trump Complaint, supra note 132, at 17 (“Notwithstanding this
guidance, on January 24, 2017, the Wall Street Journal reported that at least some
of the President’s staff were using Signal, an encrypted peer-to-peer messaging
application, to communicate with each other about Presidential or federal
business.”).
142
Id. at 3.
143
See Citizens for Resp. & Ethics in Wash. (CREW) v. Trump, 302 F. Supp.
3d 127, 131 (D.D.C. 2018), aff’d, 924 F.3d 602 (D.C. Cir. 2019).
144
About CREW, CITIZENS FOR ETHICS, https://www.citizensforethics.org
/about/ [https://perma.cc/FN72-CFLS] (last visited Mar. 9, 2021).
145
CREW v. Trump, 302 F. Supp. 3d at 127.
146
Id. at 129.
147
Id. at 133, 135–36.
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decisions are.”148 In Armstrong II, the guidelines issued by the
Executive Office of the President were subject to judicial review
because those guidelines shielded agency records from FOIA
requests by classifying the agency records as “Presidential.”149 In
CREW, the plaintiffs argued that the Trump Administration’s
treatment of ephemeral messages was a “record classification
decision” like the guidelines from the Executive Office of the
President in Armstrong II.150 Put simply, if a President permits the
use of ephemeral apps, the President is essentially classifying those
messages as personal records (and not Presidential ones) because
Presidential records cannot be deleted without the Archivist’s
permission.151 The Government disagreed with the Plaintiffs’
interpretation of Armstrong II.152 Moreover, the Government argued
that, even if the Plaintiffs’ interpretation of Armstrong II was
correct, “judicial review [was] still precluded because CREW [was]
challenging creation, management, and disposal decisions, not
classification decisions.”153
The court declined to “resolve these competing interpretations”
because, regardless of the holding in Armstrong II, the plaintiffs did
not state a valid mandamus claim.154 Both the PRA155 and the
Declaratory Judgement Act156 did not provide a “valid cause of
148

Id. at 134–35.
Id. at 135 (citing Armstrong v. Exec. Off. of the President, Off. of Admin.
(Armstrong II), 1 F.3d 1274, 1293–94 (D.C. Cir. 1993)) (“[Armstrong II] held that
although ‘the PRA impliedly precludes judicial review of the President's decisions
concerning the creation, management, and disposal of presidential records during
his term of office,’ courts ‘may review guidelines outlining what is, and what is
not, a “[P]residential record”’ because to hold otherwise would ‘be tantamount to
allowing the PRA to functionally render the FOIA a nullity.’”).
150
Id.
151
Id.
152
Id.
153
Id.
154
Id.
155
Id. (citing Jud. Watch, Inc. v. NARA, 845 F. Supp. 2d 288, 299 n.5 (D.D.C.
2012)) (“The Presidential Records Act does not itself provide [a valid cause of
action].”).
156
Id. (citing Schilling v. Rogers, 363 U.S. 666, 677 (1960)) (“Nor can the
Declaratory Judgment Act standing alone supply a cause of action: it ‘is not an
149
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action,” which is required for the court to reach a decision on the
merits.157 Likewise, mandamus relief—which gives federal courts
jurisdiction “in the nature of mandamus to compel an officer or
employee of the United States or any agency thereof to perform a
duty owed to the plaintiff”158—is a “drastic” relief that is purely
discretionary.159 Before awarding such a drastic relief, the defendant
must owe the plaintiff a “clear and compelling” duty.160
The Plaintiffs argued that two PRA provisions provided a “clear
and compelling duty.”161 The PRA requires the President to
implement “records[,] controls[,] and other necessary actions . . .
[and] all such steps as may be necessary” to capture and maintain
Presidential records.162 Additionally, records created or received by
the President or his staff “shall, to the extent practicable, be
categorized as Presidential records or personal records upon their
creation or receipt.”163
However, the court in CREW found that neither of those two
PRA provisions created a sufficiently clear duty necessary to
compel the President to create classification guidelines regarding
ephemeral messaging apps.164 Although the PRA plainly requires the
President “to take steps to preserve records, [the PRA] nowhere
dictates which steps to take” and “nowhere clearly and definitively
directs [the President] to issue particular guidelines.”165 Apparently,
the PRA does not create a clear, compelling, or indisputable duty to
issue guidelines about preserving records; without any guidelines to

independent source of federal jurisdiction’ and thus ‘the availability of
[declaratory] relief presupposes the existence of a judicially remediable right.’”).
157
Id.
158
28 U.S.C. § 1361.
159
Citizens for Resp. & Ethics in Wash. (CREW) v. Trump, 302 F. Supp. 3d
127, 135 (D.D.C. 2018), aff’d, 924 F.3d 602 (D.C. Cir. 2019).
160
Id. at 136 (citing In re Cheney, 406 F.3d 723, 729 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (en
banc)).
161
Id. at 136.
162
44 U.S.C. § 2203(a).
163
Id. § 2203(b).
164
CREW, 302 F. Supp. 3d at 137.
165
Id.
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review, like the record classification guidelines in Armstrong II, the
PRA precludes judicial review.166
Despite the Court’s insistence that it was not ruling on the merits
of the case, the Court nevertheless declared that: “The use of
automatically-disappearing text messages to conduct White House
business would almost certainly run afoul of the Presidential
Records Act.”167 Thus, the decision in CREW provides two
significant takeaways. First, a President’s use of ephemeral
messaging applications almost certainly violates the PRA. Second,
if other courts follow the precedent in CREW, those courts are
unlikely to find that the PRA provides a “clear and compelling duty”
to create classification guidelines for new forms of communication
technology or follow other PRA provisions.168 If the PRA does not
provide a “clear and compelling duty,” a court is also unlikely to
find that the PRA creates a private right of action. Consequently,
judicial action will likely be precluded in PRA cases, and citizens
must find a remedy elsewhere.

166

Id. at 135.
Id.
168
For example, the plaintiffs in CREW appealed the district court’s decision
because the district court failed to address “whether the use of message-deleting
apps violated the other two [PRA] duties identified in the complaint (records
categorization and pre-disposal notification).” Citizens for Resp. & Ethics in
Wash. v. Trump, 924 F.3d 602, 605 (D.C. Cir. 2019). To reach its decision, the
appellate court judicially noticed a memorandum from White House Counsel
“direct[ing] White House personnel to ‘conduct all work-related communications
on [their] official ... email account[s]’ and to ‘preserve electronic communications
that are presidential records.’” Id. at 605–07. Similarly, the court also took judicial
notice of an email advising staff that the “‘[u]se of ... messaging apps (such as
Snapchat, Confide, Slack or others) ... is not permitted.’” Id. Although the
plaintiffs cited recent news articles—reporting that “White House personnel have
continued using message-deleting apps” despite the pending lawsuit and White
House Counsel reminders—the appellate court found that those news reports did
not matter. Id. at 608. Even if the PRA is “imperfectly enforced,” the appellate
court still “lack[ed] jurisdiction to order the White House to take corrective
action.” Id.
167
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V.

THE PRESIDENT’S USE OF EPHEMERAL MESSAGING APPS
As inferred in CREW, the use of ephemeral messaging
applications almost certainly violates the PRA. However, courts are
seemingly prohibited from intervening, demonstrating how the
PRA’s purpose is frustrated by a President’s use of ephemeral
messaging apps.
A. The Problem with a President Using Ephemeral Messaging Apps
The President’s duties under the PRA are sometimes categorized
as “creation, management, and disposal decisions.”169 A “creation
decision,” as its name suggests, is “the determination to make a
record documenting [P]residential activities.”170 A “management
decision,” on the other hand, “describes the day-to-day process by
which [P]residential records are maintained.”171 Lastly, a “disposal
decision” involves the process outlined in 44 U.S.C. §§ 2203(c)–(e),
which requires the President to ask the Archivist for permission
before destroying any Presidential records that “no longer have
administrative, historical, informational, or evidentiary value.”172
Ephemeral messaging apps prevent the President from making the
second type of decision mandated under the PRA—managing the
records a President creates—because a “creation” decision instantly
transforms into a “disposal” decision when a President
communicates on ephemeral messaging apps.
Skipping over a “managing decision” is particularly problematic
because, in the “management decisions” timeframe, the President is
statutorily obligated to make several choices. First, the President
must decide if the “documentary material” should be “categorized
as “Presidential” or “personal” upon their creation or receipt.”173 If
the record is related to any of the President’s “constitutional,
statutory, or other official or ceremonial duties,”174 it is a Presidential
169

Armstrong v. Exec. Off. of the President, Off. of Admin. (Armstrong II), 1
F.3d 1274, 1294 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (quoting Armstrong v. Bush (Armstrong I), 924
F.2d 282, 290–91 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
170
Id. (citing 44 U.S.C. § 2203(a)).
171
Id. (citing 44 U.S.C. § 2203(a), (b)).
172
44 U.S.C. § 2203(c), (e).
173
Id. § 2203(b).
174
Id. § 2203(a).
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record; if the record consists of “purely private or nonpublic”
documentary material, then it is a personal one.175 Next, the
President should decide what to do with those materials that are
categorized as Presidential records.176 The President must either
“preserve[] and maintain[]” the Presidential records or ask
permission from the Archivist before destroying the records.177
The crux of the problem with many ephemeral messaging apps
is that, as soon as a President or the President’s staff opens an
ephemeral message, the message disappears shortly thereafter.178
Consequently, even if the President has time to decide whether a
record is Presidential or personal, the President has little time to
preserve those messages before the messages are destroyed.
Similarly, the disappearance of ephemeral messages happens before
the President can obtain permission from the Archivist, as statutorily
required.179 Because ephemeral messaging apps disrupt the process
for maintaining records established by the PRA, using ephemeral
messaging apps to create and receive Presidential records violates
the PRA.
B. Ephemeral Messaging Apps Frustrate the Purpose of the
Presidential Records Act
In the aftermath of the Watergate scandal under the Nixon
Administration in 1978,180 Congress enacted the PRA.181 Although
the PRA was enacted decades before ephemeral messaging apps
were invented,182 the legislative history of the PRA provides a useful
tool to determine whether the purpose of the PRA has been thwarted
by ephemeral messaging.
The PRA is a complex piece of legislation enacted for various
reasons. Yet, the original drafters of the PRA intended for the PRA
175

Id. § 2201(3).
Id. § 2203(a), (c)–(e).
177
Id.
178
See Ranns, supra note 84, at 256.
179
44 U.S.C. § 2203(c)–(e).
180
Citizens for Resp. & Ethics in Wash. v. Cheney, 593 F. Supp. 2d 194, 198
(D.D.C. 2009).
181
44 U.S.C. § 2201 et seq.
182
O’Connell, supra note 95.
176
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to serve two primary purposes.183 First, the PRA established that the
public, not the President, owns any records created by the President
when fulfilling official duties.184 The enactment of the PRA
terminated the “private ownership” of Presidential records and freed
the public from relying on the Presidential tradition of
“volunteerism” to access a President’s records.185 Second, the PRA
established procedures to guarantee Presidential records would be
preserved and available to the public once the President leaves
office, assuring “preservation of the historical record” and
mandating that public access would be “fixed in law.”186 In sum,
when determining whether an act thwarts the purpose of the PRA,
the drafters considered the important purposes of the PRA to be: (1)
maintaining public ownership, (2) establishing procedures to
guarantee public access, and (3) ensuring the preservation of
historical records.
When assessing the PRA’s legislative history, it is also
imperative to understand the historical backdrop of the Act (i.e.,
President Nixon’s actions following Watergate) and why President
Nixon’s actions spurred Congress to enact the PRA at that particular
point in history.187 When the PRA was introduced, Congress desired
to protect future Presidential records from being destroyed after

183

H.R. REP. NO. 95-1487, at 5733 (1978).
Id.
185
Id.
186
Id.
187
Hearings Regarding Executive Order 13233 and the Presidential Records
Act Before the H. Comm. on Gov’t. Reform and H. Subcomm. on Gov’t. Efficiency,
Fin. Mgmt. and Intergovernmental Relations, 107th Cong. 80-152 (2001-2002)
(statement of Anna Nelson, Professor, American University),
https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CHRG-107hhrg80152/html/CHRG107hhrg80152.htm [https://perma.cc/E9K7-VZVW] [hereinafter Hearings
Regarding Executive Order 13233] (“Influenced by the actions of former
President Nixon, then, as the Archivist Mr. Carlin noted, Congress passed the
Presidential Records Act for two reasons: one, to ensure the protection of these
records so that they could not be destroyed, since Mr. Nixon was in that business;
and, second, to ensure that the records of the Presidents would be open within a
reasonable period of time.”).
184
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witnessing President Nixon’s attempts at destruction.188 Similarly,
future Congresses have come to understand that the PRA was meant
to “inhibit the kind of secrecy and dirty tricks that characterized the
Nixon re-election campaign.”189 In other words, the PRA was
enacted to prevent Presidents from rewriting history, whether they
intend to bolster their reputation or cover up any wrongdoings.190
Given the historical background and legislative history of the
PRA, a President’s use of ephemeral messaging apps frustrates the
purpose of the PRA for three reasons. First, ephemeral messaging
apps fail to maintain public ownership because government property
is destroyed—thereby preventing the public from ever accessing
those records.191 Second, ephemeral messaging apps violate the
procedures established in the PRA because the Archivist’s
permission is not obtained before disposing of the record, and the
record is not preserved.192 Third, ephemeral messaging apps prevent
the creation of an authentic historical record. Even if a President is
otherwise complying with the PRA, the historical record being
preserved is more like the flattering tapes President Nixon intended

188

Id.; see also Citizens for Resp. & Ethics in Wash. v. Trump, 924 F.3d 602,
604 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (“Richard Nixon could only have dreamed of the technology
at issue in this case: message-deleting apps that guarantee confidentiality by
encrypting messages and then erasing them forever once read by the recipient.”).
189
Hearings Regarding Executive Order 13233, supra note 187 (statement of
Rep. Jan Schakowsky, Member, H. S. Comm. on Gov’t Efficiency, Fin. Mgmt.,
and Intergovernmental Relations).
190
Id. (statement of Richard Reeves, Author of PRESIDENT NIXON: ALONE IN
THE WHITE HOUSE) (“And no matter what archival system is used, the families
and the former aides will try to protect their reputation, which is what you would
expect of them, and you would expect of us to try to bring that into more objective
light. They were greatly influenced, the American Presidents of our generation,
by Winston Churchill, who once said, ‘my task, my goal is to make the history
and then write it before anyone else does.’ That is one of the reasons Richard
Nixon was keeping tapes.”).
191
See infra Part VI.B.
192
44 U.S.C. § 2203(c), (e) (explaining that the President must seek permission
from the Archivist before disposing of Presidential records and that the Archivist
may sometimes seek advice from Congress if the Archivist thinks it is in the public
interest to do so or thinks Congress may have a special interest in the records).
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to create rather than the authentic historical account that Congress
envisioned.193
VI.

TWO SOLUTIONS TO STRENGTHEN THE PRESIDENTIAL
RECORDS ACT AND PROTECT THE ACT’S PURPOSE
Congress should amend the PRA to prevent a President from
using ephemeral messaging apps because the use of those apps to
conduct official business violates the PRA and frustrates its purpose.
Given that judicial remedies are limited,194 as demonstrated in
CREW, Congress should create a private right of action or, in the
alternative, hold a President criminally liable for the destruction of
government property if the President uses ephemeral messaging
apps to conduct official business.
A. Congress Should Create a Private Right of Action
One way to prevent the destruction of government records is to
grant individuals a private right of action against any administrative
official who intentionally destroys Presidential records. This
solution would allow courts to adjudicate legitimate claims instead
of precluding judicial intervention on procedural grounds.195
1. How to Structure the Private Right of Action and Handle Litigation
First, a heightened pleading standard should be implemented to
better insulate the President from frivolous and excessive PRA
litigation. For example, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require

193

Hearings Regarding Executive Order 13233, supra note 187 (explaining
that the reason President Nixon recorded his secret tapes was not to create an
accurate record, but to write his version of history first and discard the portions
that painted him in an unfavorable light). Congresswomen Janice Schakowsky
also touches on this point when she describes the tension between how Congress
views the PRA versus how the President (or, at least, President Bush) does. Id.
According to Schawosky, Congress reasoned that, “[i]f officials know their acts
will become a matter of public record in the future . . . they will alter their behavior
today.” Id. However, President Bush countered that Presidents and other public
officials will not be truthful or speak candidly “[i]f officials know their acts will
become a matter of public record in the future.” Id.
194
See supra Part V.
195
Id.
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fraud claims to be pled with a heightened degree of specificity.196 A
similar standard could be required to bring forth claims under the
PRA because implementing a heightened standard forces plaintiffs
to “do more than the usual investigation” before initiating a suit.197
Requiring a heightened degree of specificity also gives the President
some deference when conducting day-to-day operations, just like
Congress originally granted the President more deference when
enacting the PRA by prohibiting the public from immediately
accessing Presidential records.198
Additionally, these potential suits brought under a heightened
pleading standard could be dismissed unless there is evidence within
the complaint that ephemeral messaging apps are being used to
either conduct official business or hide information from the public.
One option for plaintiffs to fulfill this requirement is by creating a
non-exclusive “factors” test for courts to apply when deciding
whether to grant a President’s motion to dismiss. For example,
courts could require evidence concerning: (1) whether a public
official downloaded an ephemeral messaging app on their work or
personal phone, (2) when the app was downloaded (i.e., in close
temporal relation to a political event), (3) time stamps indicating
when the app was used, (4) the recipient of the ephemeral messages,
(5) the rationale for why the President or the President’s staff needed
to use an ephemeral messaging app versus another communication
196

FED. R. CIV. P. 9(b) (“In alleging fraud or mistake, a party must state with
particularity the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake. Malice, intent,
knowledge, and other conditions of a person’s mind may be alleged generally.”).
197
Adam Hirsh, It’s All in the Details: The Importance of FRCP Rule 9 in
Fraud Cases, FIN. POISE (Sept. 24, 2020), https://www.financialpoise.com/frcprule-9-fraud/ [https://perma.cc/57QE-R9QY].
198
Armstrong v. Exec. Off. of the President, Off. of Admin. (Armstrong II), 1
F.3d 1274, 1292 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (citing Armstrong v. Bush (Armstrong I), 924
F.2d 282, 290 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (“Congress was ‘keenly aware of the separation
of powers concerns that were implicated by legislation regulating the conduct of
the President’s daily operations,’ and thus sought ‘to minimize outside
interference with the day-to-day operations of the President and his closest
advisors and to ensure executive branch control over [P]residential records during
the President’s term of office.’”); Armstrong I, 924 F.2d at 290–91 (explaining
that “the intricate statutory scheme Congress carefully drafted to keep in equipoise
important competing political and constitutional concerns” precluded judicial
review under the PRA).
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method, (6) the number of messages sent on the ephemeral
messaging apps, or (7) the total time logged in the app. Finally, if
the ephemeral messaging app has time stamps demonstrating when
White House officials used the messaging apps, those time stamps
could create a presumption that the message included material
related to the President’s official duties if the individual sending or
receiving the message was on the clock or at the White House when
the message was sent.
2. Benefits and Drawbacks
One key benefit of implementing a private right of action is that
allowing individuals to sue the President does not unnecessarily
restrict the free speech of government officials.199 In Missouri,
Governor Eric Greitens was accused of using an ephemeral
messaging app to conduct official business.200 When Greitens was
sued, the court refused to grant a temporary restraining order
prohibiting the Governor from using ephemeral messaging apps
because the judge worried that granting such an order would infringe
on the Governor’s First Amendment right.201 Similarly, the
provisions in the PRA allowing a President to segregate political
records (i.e., records about political activities that do not directly
affect a President’s duties) from Presidential ones stemmed from
related First Amendment concerns.202 More specifically, the political
versus Presidential distinction was implemented so that the PRA
“would not impinge on the President’s First Amendment right to
free speech or political association.”203 Thus, creating a private right
of action would align with Congress’s decision to not unnecessarily
“impinge” on the President’s First Amendment rights.
199

Stewart, supra note 11, at 2 (“In Missouri, two attorneys sued then-Governor
Eric Greitens, arguing that his use of Confide violated the state’s public records
law. A county judge denied their request for a temporary restraining order to halt
Greitens’s use of Confide, in part, because of a lack of evidence that he had been
using it to conduct government business, but noted that there were ‘a whole bunch
of open questions here,’ including whether the governor has a First Amendment
right to use the app to communicate, as his attorneys contended.”).
200
Id.
201
Id.
202
H.R. REP. NO. 95-1487, at 5732–33 (1978).
203
Id.
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Additionally, other government officials have brought similar
suits under the First Amendment when the government, while acting
as an individual’s employer, allegedly restricted an individual’s
First Amendment rights.204 In those cases, the government was not
allowed to restrict its employee’s speech if the individual was acting
as a “private citizen.”205 Typically, these cases arise when employees
are fired after posting certain content on social media.206 Creating a
private right of action would not run afoul of such problems because
government officials are not altogether banned from using social
media apps that have ephemeral messaging functionality—
government officials are only prohibited from using ephemeral
messaging apps if the material discussed relates to their “official
capacity.”207
However, creating a private right of action amendment would
inevitably result in more work for the President. Indeed, the
President would almost certainly face more litigation.208 This
204

Lata Nott, Government Employees & First Amendment Overview, FREEDOM
F. INST. (Apr. 24, 2017), https://www.freedomforuminstitute.org/firstamendment-center/topics/freedom-of-speech-2/free-speech-and-governmentemployees-overview/ [https://perma.cc/HZJ6-9P5C].
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Id.
206
David L. Hudson Jr., Public Employees, Private Speech: 1st Amendment
Doesn’t Always Protect Government Workers, ABA J. (May 1, 2017, 4:10 AM),
https://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/public_employees_private_speech
[https://perma.cc/Q6GF-R2L4] (explaining that the “problem in any case is to
arrive at a balance between the interests of the teacher, as a citizen, in commenting
upon matters of public concern and the interest of the state, as an employer, in
promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs through its
employees”). As one Fourth Circuit judge noted, “the speculative ills targeted by
the social networking policy are not sufficient to justify such sweeping restrictions
on officers’ freedom to debate matters of public concern.” Id. On the other hand,
employers feel they should be able to punish employees for racist or inflammatory
speech that goes against company values and reflects poorly on their business.
207
Id. (“In Garcetti v. Ceballos (2006), the court declared that when public
employees make statements pursuant to their official job duties, they have no free
speech protection at all—even if the speech blows the whistle on alarming
governmental corruption.”).
208
Armstrong v. Exec. Off. of the President, Off. of Admin. (Armstrong II), 1
F.3d 1274, 1292 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (citing Armstrong v. Bush (Armstrong I), 924
F.2d 282, 290 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (“Congress was ‘keenly aware of the separation
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increase in litigation is especially true for litigation regarding the
PRA, which is often funded by watchdogs or other nonprofits who
have the resources and time to take on such lengthy litigation.209
Finally, and most importantly, this solution depends on action
by Congress and support from the courts. Creating a private right of
action would require Congress to amend the PRA—which depends
on the political will of Congress at the time the bill is brought to the
floor.210 Additionally, a plaintiff may lack Article III standing unless
the Supreme Court expands current standing doctrine for subsequent
caselaw.211
B. Congress Should View the President’s Use of Ephemeral
Messaging Apps as a Crime
Because all Presidential records are government property, a
President’s decision to destroy Presidential records via the use of
ephemeral messaging apps should be treated as the destruction of
government property. Therefore, the President should be subject to
criminal liability.

of powers concerns that were implicated by legislation regulating the conduct of
the President’s daily operations,’ and thus sought ‘to minimize outside
interference with the day-to-day operations of the President and his closest
advisors and to ensure executive branch control over [P]residential records during
the President’s term of office.’”)). Thus, Armstrong II implies that the President’s
workflow would be hindered if the President cannot maintain complete control
over their records and is constantly dealing with litigation. See also Citizens for
Resp. & Ethics in Wash. v. Cheney, 593 F. Supp. 2d 194, 198 (D.D.C. 2009)
(explaining that “judicial review ‘would upset the intricate statutory scheme
Congress carefully drafted to keep in equipoise important competing political and
constitutional concerns’”) (quoting Armstrong II, 924 F.2d at 290–91).
209
See About CREW, supra note 144 and accompanying text.
210
Lee Drutman, Congress Should Do Its Job. But the Job Members Can Do
Depends on the Resources They Have, VOX (Feb. 15, 2017, 11:40 AM),
https://www.vox.com/polyarchy/2017/2/15/14623588/congress-underresourced
[https://perma.cc/NNM8-49FZ].
211
See generally Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992)
(internal quotations omitted) (explaining that, in order to obtain standing, a
plaintiff must show: (1) that the plaintiff suffered an “injury in fact” that is “actual
or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical,” (2) a “causal connection between
the injury and the conduct complained of,” and (3) the injury is redressable).
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1.

Presidential Records are Government Property
The PRA provides that the U.S. Government has “complete
ownership, possession, and control of [all] Presidential records.”212
The words “ownership,213 possession,214 and control” are strong
terms of art in the realm of property law, and Congress did not
choose these words by accident.215
Yet again, understanding the legislative context of the PRA is
crucial because, when enacting the PRA, “the principal issue, and
the one on which all of the witnesses were in agreement, was that
action should be taken by Congress to declare a President’s official
records the property of the United States.”216 One of the main issues
in the Watergate scandal was determining who owned President
Nixon’s secret tape recordings from the Oval Office.217 President
Nixon argued the tapes were his personal property because the tapes
detailed President Nixon’s personal conversations.218 However, the
government argued the tapes were government property because the
tapes chronicled President Nixon’s decisions in his official capacity
as President.219 Thus, Congress enacted the PRA with the specific
purpose of preventing future Presidents from claiming ownership
212

44 U.S.C. § 2202.
Denise R. Johnson, Reflections on the Bundle of Rights, 32 VT. L. REV. 247,
253 (2007) (explaining how ownership has come to include a “bundle of rights”).
214
Carol M. Rose, Possession as the Origin of Property, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 73,
74 (1985) (“For the common law, possession or “occupancy” is the origin of
property.”).
215
Citizens for Resp. & Ethics in Wash. v. Trump (CREW I), 302 F. Supp. 3d
127, 130 (D.D.C. 2018), aff’d, 924 F.3d 602 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (emphasis added)
(“[The PRA] was enacted in 1978 following controversy over the ownership of
Richard Nixon’s [P]residential records. Congress, in passing the PRA, ‘sought to
establish the public ownership of [P]residential records and ensure the
preservation of [P]residential records for public access after the termination of a
President’s term in office.’” (internal citations omitted)).
216
H.R. REP. NO. 95-1487, 5738 (1978).
217
Citizens for Resp. & Ethics in Wash. v. Cheney, 593 F. Supp. 2d 194, 198
(D.D.C. 2009).
218
John M. Crewdson, White House Says Tapes Are Nixon’s Own Property
(Aug. 15, 1974),
https://www.nytimes.com/1974/08/15/archives/white-house-says-tapes-arenixons-own-property-they-will-be.html [https://perma.cc/KY59-5H4X].
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over records created by the President—deliberately intending to
invoke traditional property concepts when using the words
“ownership, possession, and control.”220
Congress is not the only one to invoke property law concepts
when determining how to access Presidential records and resolve
other PRA problems. Legal scholars have likewise asserted that
property law effectively solves PRA issues, although in a different
context.221 Jonathon Turley, a George Washington University Law
Professor, argued that common law property principles could be
used to convert documentary materials (created by Presidents who
held office before the PRA was enacted) into public property.222
All records created by Presidents whose terms began before the
PRA was enacted are not subject to the PRA.223 While pre-PRA
Presidents have historically donated their Presidential materials to
the government or to their own museums,224 there are some
Presidential records that “Congress either did not consider . . . to be
public property or, more likely, [Congress] was content to leave the
issue unresolved and rely on the good intentions of former
Presidents.”225 Turley’s article focuses on converting those private
records into government property, explaining that “[f]or post-PRA
Presidents and their successors, there was no further legitimacy to
private property claims after Congress declared these records to be
the property of the American people.”226 While Turley’s conclusion
is different than the one advanced in this Article, the underlying
premise is the same: the government’s ownership of Presidential

220

Cheney, 593 F. Supp. 2d 194, 198 (D.D.C. 2009).
See generally Jonathan Turley, Presidential Papers and Popular
Government: The Convergence of Constitutional and Property Theory in Claims
of Ownership and Control of Presidential Records, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 651
(2003) (arguing that Presidents whose terms ended before the enactment of the
PRA could be considered public property).
222
Id. at 651.
223
Id. at 721–29.
224
Id. at 661; Bruce P. Montgomery, Nixon’s Legal Legacy: White House
Papers and the Constitution, 56 AM. ARCHIVIST 586, 591 (1993).
225
Turley, supra note 221, at 664.
226
Id. at 707–25.
221
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records changes what a President may or may not do with those
records.
Accordingly, if a President destroys records or otherwise
handles records in a way that violates the law, the President could
potentially be prosecuted. Because Presidential records are
government property, ownership vests in the government as soon as
a Presidential record is sent or received.227 Notably, the PRA never
specifies that the government only owns Presidential records after
the President leaves office.228 Instead, the PRA states that any
records created by the President or related to the President’s official
duties are under the “ownership, possession, and control” of the
government—demonstrating that the government owns Presidential
records the moment a Presidential record is created.229 Thus, after
ownership is vested in the government, the destruction, deletion, or
disposal of Presidential records constitutes the destruction of
government property.
2.

Two Statutes Governing the Destruction of Government Property
The two most common statutes that criminalize the destruction
of government property are 18 U.S.C. §§ 2071 and 1361.230 For
those crimes, criminal liability only attaches “to the ‘willful’
destruction of U.S. government property and U.S. government
records.”231 Notably, both crimes are specific intent crimes, so the
government must prove the President themself knew they were
violating the law when they decided to act.232 Moreover, to support
a felony conviction under § 1361, “the government must prove that
the damage from the destruction exceeded $1,000,” which may be
difficult for Presidential records that do not “have inherent value”
aside from the historical input those Presidential records provide.233
227

See supra Part V.A (explaining that a Presidential record exists immediately
after a President creates material regarding the President’s official duties).
228
See 44 U.S.C. § 2202.
229
Id.
230
Brian Greer, How to Ensure That Trump Preserves Official Documents,
LAWFARE (Nov. 6, 2020, 2:39 PM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/how-ensuretrump-preserves-official-documents [https://perma.cc/BG6L-EJPT].
231
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Thus, although these crimes could apply to a President who destroys
the Presidential records created while in office, the statutes
seemingly provide several hoops Congress must jump through
before holding a President criminally liable.
3. Benefits and Drawbacks
One of the most significant barriers to prosecuting the President,
when considering criminal liability for the destruction of
government property via the use of ephemeral messaging apps, is
the longstanding debate over whether a sitting President can be
indicted for crimes. Throughout American history, two Attorneys
General have issued separate advisory opinions on this subject—one
in 1973 and one in 2000.234 Both reports agree that indicting or
criminally prosecuting a sitting President would be
unconstitutional.235
However, a President does not necessarily need to be prosecuted
to face consequences. Impeachment is one method, squarely within
the separation of powers framework, to hold the President
accountable for “high Crimes and Misdemeanors.”236 As Gerald
Ford explained, “an impeachable offense is whatever a majority of
the House of Representatives considers it to be at a given moment
in history.”237 Though impeachment is discretionary, if Congress
234
A Sitting President’s Amenability to Indictment and Criminal Prosecution,
24 Op. Att’y Gen. 222 (2000), https://www.justice.gov/file/19351/download
[https://perma.cc/K3CC-3NKC].
235
Id. The 1973 opinion issued in response to Watergate concluded that
“indictment or criminal prosecution of a sitting President would be
unconstitutional because it would impermissibly interfere with the President’s
ability to carry out his constitutionally assigned functions and thus would be
inconsistent with the constitutional structure.” Id. at 223. After examining the
legal analysis used in the 1973 memorandum and reviewing three Supreme Court
decisions concerning separation of power arguments, the Attorney General’s 2000
opinion agreed with the 1973 memorandum, concluding that “[t]he indictment or
criminal prosecution of a sitting President would unconstitutionally undermine
the capacity of the executive branch to perform its constitutionally assigned
functions.” Id. at 222, 260.
236
U.S. CONST. art. 2, § 4.
237
Jan Wolfe, Explainer: Impeachment Depends on ‘High Crimes and
Misdemeanors’ - What are they?, REUTERS (Sept. 25, 2019, 12:52 PM),
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views the President’s use of ephemeral messaging as the destruction
of government property under §§ 2071 and 1361, Congress may be
more willing to impeach a President simply for using ephemeral
messaging apps to communicate about official business.
Nevertheless, several practical and political considerations
should be addressed. First, impeachment requires a majority of the
House of Representatives to charge a President and two-thirds of the
Senate to convict.238 Therefore, in a partisan and sharply divided
political environment, a President is more likely to be impeached in
the House of Representatives, where only a majority is required, and
is much less likely to receive the two-thirds vote needed to convict
in the Senate.239 Second, while the Constitution specifies that
Presidents may be removed for committing “other high Crimes and
Misdemeanors,”240 evidence suggests that the Founding Fathers
meant to encompass something other than the modern understanding
and classification of crimes.241 While destruction of government
property may be considered a crime, Congress holds the ultimate
authority in deciding what actions rise to the level of an impeachable
offense.242 Third, impeachment is often used “as a political weapon”
and can be initiated merely “to intimidate an otherwise powerful
office holder” or “as a strategy to advance a political agenda.”243
Thus, Congress may not have the political will to impeach a
President—even if the President has committed an impeachable
offense—or the impeachment process may be abused in a way that
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-trump-whistleblower-crimesexplai/explainer-impeachment-depends-on-high-crimes-and-misdemeanorswhat-are-they-idUSKBN1WA288 [https://perma.cc/C5TA-RVUX].
238
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239
DANIEL P. FRANKLIN ET AL., THE POLITICS OF PRESIDENTIAL IMPEACHMENT
14 (2020).
240
U.S. CONST. art. 2, § 4.
241
FRANKLIN ET AL., supra note 239, at 6 (“[Madison] clearly meant the
provision for “high crimes and misdemeanors” to mean something other than that
to which we make modern reference in the classification of crimes (i.e., felonies
and misdemeanors). As a result, the House and Senate, as elected bodies, can be
the judge of what constitutes a high crime or misdemeanor rising to the level of
impeachment. Thus, impeachment, to a considerable extent, can be considered a
political process.”).
242
Id.
243
Id. at 2.
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delegitimizes serious impeachments.244 Finally, given that four
Presidential impeachments have failed in the Senate, impeachment
may not be the most effective tool to prevent the destruction of
Presidential records.245
VII. CONCLUSION
The statutes governing the retention, preservation, access, and
disclosure of records created by the executive branch—the PRA, the
FRA, and the FOIA—are identical in some respects246 and mutually
exclusive in others.247 Accordingly, understanding how these
statutes fit together is imperative for understanding the problems
posed by a President’s use of ephemeral messaging applications.
Ephemeral messaging applications, like many new forms of
technology, pose a unique challenge to the current structure of
government record-keeping laws because ephemeral messages
delete by default. While ephemeral messages are almost certainly a
Presidential record under the PRA,248 Congress granted the President
great deference249 when drafting the PRA; thus, any issues apparent
in federal agencies’ compliance with FOIA requests and record
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Id. (“Since impeachment is both a safeguard and a political weapon, an
important question needs to be asked: Has the impeachment power been used in
accordance with its original intent, or has it evolved into something far beyond
the desires of the founders of our government?”).
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See supra Part III.B.
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Citizens for Resp. & Ethics in Wash. v. Cheney (CREW), 593 F. Supp. 2d 194,
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1978) that subsequent Presidents and Vice Presidents would comply with the Act
in good faith, and therefore, Congress limited the scope of judicial review and
provided little oversight authority for the President and Vice President’s
document preservation decisions.”).
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retention practices will almost certainly be mirrored in the
President’s handling of Presidential records.
Recently, courts have declined to stop the destruction of
governmental communications, especially when the President and
the President’s staff use ephemeral messaging applications.250 The
decision in CREW provides just one example of how the PRA’s
current statutory structure prevents courts from compelling the
President to comply with the PRA. Additionally, the dicta in CREW
demonstrates why a President’s use of ephemeral messaging apps
likely violates the PRA.
Lastly, two workable solutions prevent a President from
blocking the “sunshine” when using ephemeral messaging
applications. First, Congress could create a private right of action
for citizens to challenge a government official’s use of ephemeral
messaging applications (under a limited set of circumstances) to
prevent the loss of important government records. Notably, this
solution requires Congress to cooperate and pass meaningful
legislation creating a right of action. This solution also potentially
exposes the President to a flood of litigation. Alternatively, a
President’s use of ephemeral messaging applications could be
treated as the destruction of government property. While a President
likely cannot be prosecuted, destroying Presidential records could
constitute an impeachable offense if Congress considers the
destruction of Presidential records a high crime. However, given
that most Presidential impeachments have failed, whether the
possibility of impeachment will truly deter a President from using
ephemeral messaging apps remains unclear. Although neither of the
two solutions advanced in this Article completely prevent a
President from destroying Presidential records, these solutions give
the public a better chance of exposing Presidential records to the
“sunshine”—satisfying the purpose of both the PRA and the FOIA.
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Cheney, 593 F. Supp. 2d, at 198–99 (emphasizing that “Congress limited the
scope of judicial review and provided little oversight authority for the President
and Vice President’s document preservation decisions,” and thus, if there are “any
deficiencies in—or unintended consequences of—the PRA, that is an issue for
Congress to consider”).

